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RECONCILING EFFECTIVE FEDERAL PROSECUTION AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: "CRIMINAL CODDLING," "THE NEW
TORTURE" OR "A RATIONAL
ACCOMMODATION?"
RICHARD L. THORNBURGH*
Few concepts designed to aid the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases have been so misunder-
stood and unjustly maligned as those embodied in the
so-called "use immunity" statute' passed by Con-
gress as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970. It has been variously asserted that in the
process of obtaining testimony under this statute (1)
prosecutors are unduly harsh in bringing cruel
pressures to bear on persons to force them to testify;
or (2) they are too lenient in exercising their
discretion to "immunize" potential witnesses; or (3)
they somehow commit both errors simultaneously.
2
The author's view is that much of the concern
expressed in both camps of critics misses the real
point of the procedures utilized, i.e., that they are
simply means of compelling the testimony of persons
in criminal prosecutions, a vital component of an
effective criminal justice process and one that has
been an integral part of our system of laws since
1789.' The discussion which follows will consider,
first, the provisions of the "use immunity" statute
which permit a prosecutor to compel testimony and,
second, defense-prosecution agreements which
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
United States Department of Justice. B. Eng. Yale Uni-
versity, 1954; J.D. University of Pittsburgh School of Law,
1957. The author wishes to acknowledge the substantial
contributions to this paper made by Roger Pauley, Deputy
Chief, and Paul H. Robinson, Staff Attorney, Legislation
and Special Projects Section, Criminal Division.
118 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970) [hereinafter referred to
as 'use immunity' statute"].
2See, e.g., Safire, The New Torture, N.Y. Times, Dec.
20, 1973, at 39, col. 7. It is interesting to note that Mr.
Safire in his criticism never indicates what "limited immu-
nity," as he calls it, actually entails. Most of the confusion,
and all of Mr. Safire's hand-wringing, would most likely
be dissipated by a reading of 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970)
(Text at note 4 infra). See also Putting Witnesses on the
Rack, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16, 1975, at 6 (editorial)
and Harris, Annals of Law-Taking the Fifth, THE NEW
YORKER., Apr. 5, 1976, at 44, Apr. 12, 1976, at 43, Apr.
19, 1976, at 42.
'For a discussion of the historical roots of the federal
government's power to "immunize" witnesses from prose-
cution see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-47
(1972), and the authorities cited therein.
involve a defendant's promise to provide information
or testimony, with or without "immunity."
COMPELLING TESTIMONY UNDER 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6002-03
The Nature of the "Immunity" of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6002-03
At the outset, it must be recognized that the
proceedings authorized under the 1970 Act grant no
immunity from prosecution, per se. In fact, as of
December 14, 1974, when the repeal of 18 U.S.C. §
2514 (1968) became effective, there ceased to be any
statutory basis for granting a witness immunity from
prosecution. In place of the former statute, sections
6002-03 authorize government prosecutors to obtain
a court order to compel a person to give testimony
without a grant of immunity. 4 As the constitutional
418 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or pro-
vide other information in a proceeding before or an-
cillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee
of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcom-
mittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding com-
municates to the witness an order issued under this
part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the
order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation; but no testimony or other information com-
pelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other infor-
mation) may be used against the witness in any crimi-
nal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a
false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970) provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or
may be called to testify or provide other information at
any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the
United States or a grand jury of the United States,
the United States district court for the judicial district
in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue,
in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon
the request of the United States attorney for such dis-
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quid pro quo for imposing this obligation to testify,
section 6002 provides that such compelled testimony
cannot be used against the witness "in any criminal
case" (with an exception noted later). 5 Under this
arrangement both the witness and the government
remain in substantially the same position vis-a-vis
one another after the testimony as before. 6
This statutory scheme has distinct advantages to
both prosecutors and society over the former so-
called "transactional" immunity statutes. First, it
eliminates the possible conferring of wastefully broad
immunity from prosecution and substitutes only the
protection from use of compelled testimony which is
all that the Constitution requires. 7 It also removes
the incentive for a witness to give wide-ranging but
shallow testimony which, under a grant of transac-
tional immunity, would provide absolution for every
offense touched upon, while failing to encourage
complete candor, specificity and detail. The compul-
sion of testimony under section 6003, in contrast,
encourages the witness to disclose as many details as
possible since the use restriction imposed by the
statute is only as broad as the facts revealed during
trict, an order requiring such individual to give testi-
mony or provide other information which he refuses
to give or provide on the basis of his privilege agsinst
self-incrimination, such order to become effective as
provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the ap-
proval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, or any designated Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, request an order under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to
refuse to testify or provide other information on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
5 The "criminal case" limitation tracks the pertinent
provision of the fifth amendment to the Constitution. This
means, of course, that the witness' testimony is subject to
use against him in a non-criminal proceeding. See, e.g.,
Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1120-21 (7th Cir.
1975). Contrary to the implication in Judge Wolfson's
article appearing in this symposium, there is no impropri-
ety in such use of evidence by the government.
'In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462
(1972), the Supreme Court stated:
We conclude that the immunity provided by 18 U.S.C.
§ 6002 leaves the witness and the prosecutorial
authorities in the same position as if the witness had
claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege. The immunity
therefore is coextensive with the privilege and suffices
to supplant it.
Accord, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79
(1964); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973).
7Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
the compelled testimony.' Third, unlike a grant of
transactional immunity, compelled testimony under
the narrow "use immunity" statute does not create
the risk that a witness, whom prosecutors subse-
quently and independently find to be far more
deserving of prosecution than anticipated, will be
immune from prosecution despite the existence of
such independent evidence.
Importantly, then, under the "use immunity"
statute, the content of the defendant's prior immu-
nized testimony does not affect the prosecutor's
ability to prosecute, even for crimes that the witness
mentions in his testimony, as long as the evidence
used to prosecute those crimes is entirely independent
of the compelled statements. 9 Consequently, a wit-
ness compelled to testify under the 1970 statute does
not have "immunity" from prosecution. If that term
is at all applicable to section 6002, it is in the sense
that the witness is "immune" from having the
compelled testimony used against him in a subse-
quent prosecution, an "immunity" no different from
that provided by the fifth amendment in the first
'This may occur in those cases where the government
has difficulty in affirmatively proving that its independent
evidence is in fact untainted by the detailed testimony given.
See text accompanying notes 41-66 infra.
'Nothing in the statute hinders subsequent prosecution
of a witness, but in practice the affirmative burden on the
prosecutor to show that he has not used the compelled
testimony may be difficult and, in some cases, impossible to
meet. See text accompanying notes 41-66 infra. But the
existence of this difficulty requires some special attention in
the present discussion of the nature of the "immunity" of 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970). In those cases where proof of
non-use of compelled testimony would be difficult, an order
under 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970) might provide a certain
degree of protection from a subsequent prosecution. There
are methods by which prosecutors can reduce and possibly
overcome altogether obstacles to subsequent prosecution,
such as strict control of transcripts of compelled testimony
and prosecution before rather than after testimony is com-
pelled. But to the extent that the possibility of such obsta-
cles cannot be effectively eliminated, the prosecutor does
"give up" something which the witness "gets" upon an
order under the statute.
When, or if, this particular situation occurs one must
consider the issue of whether a prosecutor is everjustified in
giving up or reducing his ability to prosecute a person in
exchange for testimony or information. This issue of
defense-prosecution agreements is considered in the text
accompanying notes 67-69, infra. To the limited extent
that that issue is raised under the operation of the statute
the discussion in that section may be taken to apply here.
It is pertinent that the subsequent prosecution of a
compelled witness is subject to close scrutiny by the
Department of Justice. Indeed, it requires the personal
approval of the Attorney General. See U.S. Dep't of




place! 10 This somewhat strained use of the word
indicates how current usage is more a product of
historical development than linguistic accuracy. Both
as an aid to understanding, and as a means of
de-emotionalizing consideration of the present stat-
ute, it would probably be productive to discard the
terms "immunity" and "grant of immunity" and
speak solely in terms of "compelled testimony."
However, because of the impracticability of attempt-
ing to redefine a term of such widespread acceptance,
the discussion which follows will refer to compelled
testimony under sections 6001 et seq. as prompted by
a grant of "use" immunity.
What then is the status of the witness who testifies
under "use" immunity? How far does his "immu-
nity" extend? Just as the government neither loses
nor gains anything with regard to his subsequent
prosecution, neither does the witness lose or gain
anything. The prohibition against using any of
the compelled testimony, at least in a domestic
prosecution, is absolute. " It provides a "compre-
hensive safeguard, barring use of compelled testi-
mony as an 'investigatory lead,' and also barring the
use of any evidence obtained by focusing the inves-
tigation on a witness as a result of his compelled
disclosure." 12
It can thus be seen that claims that prosecutors
put cruel pressure upon witnesses to force them to
testify-"the new t6rture" -can be discarded imme-
diately and completely. To compel testimony the
prosecutor need only obtain a court order; 13 extra-
legal pressure on the prospective witness is unneces-
sary. In the same way, claims that prosecutors can
and do compel witnesses under section 6002 to lie
under oath and against their will can be attributed to
ignorance of the provisions of that statute. What a
witness receives under the statute-prohibition of the
cSee as s cited note 6 supra.
"See In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 811-12 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973), and cases cited
therein which note that the issue whether the fifth amend-
ment privilege protects against a foreign prosecution so as to
require that steps be taken to limit the access of a foreign
country to the testimony has not yet been resolved. See also
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2258 (. MeNaughton rev. ed.
1961). The court in Tierney held that grand jury secrecy
was sufficient to guard against a "substantial risk" of
foreign prosecution based on the use of the compelled
testimony, even if the fifth amendment privilege were
assumed to extend that far. But see In re Cardassi, 351 F.
Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
"2Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
"As discussed subsequently, the courts have no discre-
tion to refuse to issue an order under the statute, provided
the application is in proper form. See text accompanying
notes 24 and 25 infra.
use of the testimony-is assured before the testimony
is given, and is not affected by the content of the
testimony, with one important exception. A person
who testifies falsely when compelled by the statute
can have his false testimony used against him in a
subsequent prosecution for perjury or making a false
statement. 14 This is hardly a provision by which
prosecutors can generate false testimony. The statute
gives the witness nothing to gain by lying and
everything to lose. If he testifies truthfully, neither
he nor the government loses or gains with respect to
any subsequent prosecution.
Moreover, the shift from "transactional" to "use"
immunity makes the witness' testimony more credi-
ble. While the witness with transactional immunity
might be considered suspect for having "made a
deal" with the prosecution, the witness with testi-
monial use immunity, being compelled to testify,
gains nothing by his testimony. Not only does he
lack a motivation to lie, and indeed has much.to risk
if he does, his more independent position is known
to jurors and can make his testimony more credi-
ble. "
The only losers under the 1970 statute are those
criminals who have been convicted by the use of
compelled testimony. Federal prosecutors, utilizing
the statute, have employed the use immunity
procedure to compel testimony from "little fish" to
convict the "big fish" in scores of cases involving
members of organized crime and racketeering syn-
dicates, as well as corrupt politicians, and master-
minds of white collar fraud. 16 Those persons,
though they often assert it, of course, possess no
14See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 509 F.2d
1349, 1351 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Alter, 482
F.2d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 1973).
"But cf. United States v. Demopoulos, 506 F.2d 1171,
1179-80 (7th Cir. 1974), where the court upheld the trial
court's refusal to give an instruction that testimony of a
compelled witness "should be received with suspicion and
considered and scrutinized with the very greatest of care
and caution," but approved the giving of a milder caution-
ary instruction that the testimony of a compelled witness
"must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater
care than the testimony of an ordinary witness."
16See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
445-47 (1971); PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON
ORGANIZED CRIME, H. R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1969); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 140-41 (1967).
See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
92-94 (1964) (concerning the need for immunity statutes
generally); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GEN-
ERAL, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL LEGISLATION 135-59




"right against incrimination" by others. In this
sense, the biggest gain in the use of the statute is to
society which benefits from more effective criminal
prosecution. The usefulness of the statute in law
enforcement is not only heralded by observers and
the courts, "7 but has been repeatedly demonstrated in
its continued use by federal prosecutors.
To summarize, the compelling of testimony and
the absolute prohibition against its subsequent use,
under section 6002, is neither "criminal coddling"
nor a "new torture." Rather, in the words of the
Supreme Court, it is "a rational accommodation
between the imperatives of the [fifth amendment]
privilege and the legitimate demands of government
to compel citizens to testify." 's
The Process of Obtaining an Order to
Compel Testimony
Section 6003 provides that only the United States
Attorney for the district may request an order to
compel testimony or information in a proceeding
before or ancillary to a court or grand jury of the
United States in that district. Further, before mak-
ing such a request he must obtain the approval of the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or
any designated Assistant Attorney General. The
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Divi-
sion to which the subject matter of the case relates
has the authority to grant this approval provided,
however, that the Criminal Division does not ob-
ject to the grant of such approval. 1" This review
procedure by officials of the Department of Justice
has a dual purpose: first, to assure that all orders
are in "the public interest" [as required by section
6003(b)(1)] from a national perspective, and sec-
ond, to minimize the danger of inadvertent inter-
ference by one district with ongoing investigations
or prosecutions in another district. 20
7 See authorities cited at note 16 supra.
'5 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1971).
1928 C.F.R. § 0.175 (1975).
2'The need for such a role by Department of Justice
officials has been judicially noted:
If there be fear that an United States Attorney may
unreasonably bargain away the Government's right
and duty to prosecute, the solution lies in the adminis-
trative controls which the Attorney General of the
United States may promulgate to regulate and control
the conduct of cases by the United States Attorneys and
their assistants.
United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972).
While the Carter case concerned a promise not to prosecute,
rather than compulsion and testimonial immunity under 18
U.S.C. § 6003 (1970), the observation is equally appropri-
ate to the latter. For illustrations of why orders under the
statute require Departmental coordination see the text
accompanying notes 29-31 infra.
To implement the requirements of the statute, the
Department of Justice has set up detailed proce-
dures for obtaining a compulsion order. A request
initiated by an Assistant United States Attorney or
other government attorney" must be submitted to
the United States Attorney, or in his absence his
Chief Assistant, before submission to the Depart-
ment. Requests, submitted on a departmental form
requiring all pertinent information for a knowl-
edgeable review of the request, are sent to the divi-
sion having authority over the subject matter of the
case, or if the choice of the appropriate division is
not clear, to the Immunity and Records Unit of the
Criminal Division which forwards the request to the
appropriate division. 22
The prerequisites a United States Attorney must
satisfy in deciding to apply for an order are set out in
the statute. Section 6003(b) requires that he have
concluded that "the testimony or other informa-
tion ... may be necessary to the public interest"
and that the witness "has refused or is likely to re-
fuse to testify or provide information on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination." Obviously,
the most difficult issue for both the United States
Attorney requesting the order and the Department of
Justice officials authorizing the request is whether
such an order would be in "the public interest."
Many factors are pertinent to making this decision,
including the seriousness of the crime with respect to
which the witness will testify, the involvement and
culpability, if any, of the witness in the crime, and
the ability of the prosecutor to prosecute the case
without the testimony of the witness concerned. Ad-
ditional factors include the ability of the prosecutor
to prosecute the witness for his criminal activity in-
dependent of the testimony for which he is immu-
nized, the likelihood that the witness will refuse to
testify even if ordered to do so by the court, and
whether, if a witness does refuse to testify, there will
be an effective sanction against such contemptuous
conduct. A consideration of whether the witness'
compelled testimony might lead to unfortunate col-
lateral consequences, such as physical reprisals by a
putative defendant, the likelihood that the witness
"These are usually Criminal Division or Antitrust
Division attorneys. A proposal now under consideration by
the Department would permit such department attorneys
to initially submit an application to the Department
without prior approval, although the United States Attor-
ney would still need to approve the application before
submission to the court.
"The Immunity and Records Unit of the Criminal
Division also coordinates the further distribution of requests
concerning the Division to each of the sections within the




will commit perjury, and the question of whether
the prosecutor could bring a prosecution against him
if he did are also elements of this determination. The
value of the case at hand in achieving an effective
program. of enforcing pertinent criminal laws is a
final important part of this "public interest" in-
quiry.
If the application receives the approval of the
appropriate division head, and the Assistant At-
torney General in charge of ihe Criminal Division
has no objection, a letter of authorization is sent by
the division head to the United States Attorney,
who then attaches the letter to a motion for an order
compelling testimony under the statute."
The normal processing of an authorization for an
application under section 6003 can take as long as
two weeks from the time the Department receives a
request to the time it mails the authorization letter if
approved. While conscientious case preparation nor-
mally makes this a sufficient response time, situa-
tions inevitably arise where an important witness
unexpectedly refuses to testify, asserting his privilege
against self-incrimination. On such occasions the
"Judge Wolfson notes in his article that in response to a
letter to the Attorney General asking whether the Depart-
ment made any "meaningful review" of immunity requests,
he was told, among other things, that: "The standards for
approving requests are being reviewed and modified at
present." Judge Wolfson concluded: "I take this to mean
that ... [t]he Justice Department has been virtually with-
out standards for approval of the requests." This conclu-
sion (as the quoted statement plainly implies) is inaccurate.
Wolfson, Immunity-How It Works in Real Life, 67 J.
CRIN. L. & C. 167, 167-68 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Wolfson].
In implementing the statutory standards of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-05 (1970), the Department issued a memorandum
on the subject of immunity on September 2, 1971. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Memo. No. 595. This memorandum was
supplemented with other formal directives on June 9, 1972,
October 30, 1973, and November 6, 1973. A memorandum
concerning informal immunity was issued on October 4,
1972. Indeed, the Department published in the Federal
Register on December 23, 1970, Order No. 445-70 which
described the Department's procedures for reviewing im-
munity requests. 35 Fed. Reg. 19397 (1970). This was
amended by Order No. 541-73 which was published in the
Federal Register on October 2, 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 27285
(1973). The Department's procedures as amended now
appear in 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.175-.178 (1975). Judge Wolfson
thus need not have written the Attorney General to
ascertain that the Department makes a "meaningful
review" of immunity requests. It has provided and contin-
ues to provide such review. The seriousness with which it
regards its review role is evident from the formation of the
task force for review of the Department's policies and
procedures in the area-the enterprise which Judge Wolf-
son "take[s] to mean that... the Justice Department
has been virtually without" meaningful review.
necessary application can be made to the Depart-
ment by teletype and the review process is acceler-
ated.
When a properly drafted motion requesting an
order under the statute is presented to a court, it
must be granted. Section 6003 provides: "the
United States district court ... shall issue...
upon the request of the United States attorney ...
an order requiring such individual to give testimony
or provide further information . . . " (emphasis
added). The statute mandates the order if the prereq-
uisites are satisfied; i.e., that the witness is un-
likely to refuse to testify based on his privilege
against self-incrimination, and the testimony may be
necessary to the public interest, both in the judgment
of the United States Attorney. The legislative history
is clear on this point. Both the Senate and House
reports on the Organized Crime Control Act state:
"The court's role in granting the order is merely to
find the facts on which the order is predicated. The
statutory language is shall." 24 Court decisions have
likewise accepted this view. 15
Finally, it should be noted that the granting of the
2 4
SENATE COIM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED
CRME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1969); HOUSE COM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970,
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1970).
After noting the fact that the court has no authority to
deny a properly framed compulsion request, Judge Wolfson
says in his article: "There is no other area in the law
where a judge is told he must do so much to a person
without pausing to determine if he should." Wolfson, supra
note 23, at 168. Contrary to Judge Wolfson's belief, the is-
suance of an order compelling testimony is not unique in the
respect that it denies judges discretion. Federal law in other
areas requires judges to take serious actions involving
individuals-even actions involving a loss of liberty-based
upon the exercise of judgment by a prosecutor. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 4(a), for example, requires the court to issue a
summons instead of an arrest warrant upon the "request of
the attorney for the government" (conversely, an arrest
warrant must issue if the prosecutor does not elect to use a
summons; see Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241
(1932)). In this class of cases, as under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001
et seq. (1970), the Congress has previously made the consti-
tutionally conclusive determination, which judges must
honor, that the prosecutor rather than the court is in the
best position to make the deceision whether (or what man-
ner of) legal process shall issue. Cf. Exparte United States,
242 U.S. 27 (1916), holding that Congress may divest fed-
eral courts of discretion as to the type of sentence to be im-
posed upon conviction for a federal offense.
21See, e.g., In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 804-05, n.2
(1st Cir. 1974) and cases cited therein. For a discussion of
the corollary issue of whether a judge can issue such a
compulsion and testimonial immunity order sua sponte, or




motion and the issuance of the order does not make
the order effective to compel testimony and provide
testimonial immunity. The order becomes effective
only after the witness refuses to answer questions
based upon an assertion of his privilege against
self-incrimination, and after the order is then com-
municated to him by the person presiding over the
proceeding. 2 6 At a trial thejudge would communicate
the order; before a grand jury the foreman would do
so. Any testimony given after this communication
cannot be used directly or indirectly in a subsequent
criminal prosecution of the witness (save in a false
statement or perjury prosecution as discussed ear-
lier).2" The threat of his self-incriminating 'state-
ments being used against him in a criminal pro-
ceeding thus removed, the witness is obliged to
answer all questions put to him. A witness who
continues to refuse to testify may be cited for
contempt. 2
Practical Problem v for the Department of Justice
Under the Immunized Testimony Statute:
Proving That Immunized Testimony Was .Vot
"Ued" in a Subsequent Prosecution
Several problems have arisen under the compelled
testimony statute which are of concern to the
Department of Justice. For example, the Depart-
ment has the responsibility to coordinate applications
to compel immunized testimony so that their use will
not unnecessarily hamper prosecution efforts in
other jurisdictions, state as well as federal; 21 yet,
recently-enacted laws and current proposals2 0 may
limit the development of information retrieval sys-
tems necessary to effectively execute this supervi-
sory role. An information system which readily
2618 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
2 'Even here stringent limitations obtain. See United
States v. Hockenberry, 474 F.2d 247, 249-50 (3rd Cir.
1973), a case tried and argued by the author while serving
as United States Attorney for Western Pennsylvania,
holding that truthful testimony, given in the same proceed-
ing for which the defendant is on trial upon a charge of
having made A false statement, cannot be later used by the
government to impeach the defendant.
2 Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970), a
witness refusing "without just cause" to comply with a
court order to testify may be summarily ordered to be
confined until he is willing to comply, such period not to
exceed the life of the court proceeding or the term of the
grand jury in question. See also 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970);
FED.R.CRIM.P. 42.
2 For a discussion of the ability of state immunity grants
to affect federal prosecution, see text accompanying notes
50-52 infra.
30 E.g., The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(Supp. IV, 1974); H.R. 8227; S. 2008, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1975).
provides information on persons subject to crimi-
nal investigation or prosecution by state or federal
authorities is required, due to the structure of the law
regarding immunity. Such information is necessary
for use by federal authorities not only in evaluating
applications by United States Attorneys but also for
responding to inquiries by state authorities who are
considering grants of immunity.
Another matter of concern to the Department is
that its supervisory responsibilities under section
6003 require it to infringe to some degree upon the
traditional independence of a local United States
Attorney in handling his cases. This tradition of
autonomy reinforces sensible and practical policies
which recognize that, as prosecutor, the United
States Attorney is in a unique position to make
strategy and value judgments which depend upon
intimate knowledge of the facts of the particular case.
The Department's role, however, is no less essential.
It must coordinate applications for use of the statute
to avoid unnecessary interference among districts,
and indeed sovereigns; " it also must assure that
each application for use of the statute is in "the
public interest" from a national as well as from a
local perspective. In devising its system for review of
applications for compulsion orders the Department
must and does attempt to accommodate both of these
legitimate interests.
One significant difficulty that can arise when using
the 1970 statute is meeting the affirmative burden
now placed upon the government to show that the
evidence introduced in a criminal proceeding, against
a person previously compelled to testify, has been
derived from a wholly independent source.
Historical Background of Prosecutor's Burden of
Proving A.o Taint. Under grants of transactional
immunity the issue of the use of immunized testi-
mony never arose since subsequent prosecution was
barred completely. Such was the typical form of
immunity for the eighty years or so between the
enactment of the Compulsory Testimony Act of
1893" and the 1970 Act.
Before this period, however, federal statutes such
as the Immunity Act of 1868 " permitted the compul-
sion of testimony but barred its direct use in a
subsequent prosecution. However, the Supreme
Court's 1892 decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock"4
held that this practice did not provide full fifth
I IThis refers to sovereign states, not countries. See note
11 supra.
32 Actof Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443, as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
"Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37 (repealed 1910).
34142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892).
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amendment protection to witnesses. It concluded
that the statute, a version of the 1868 Act, "could not,
and would not, prevent the use of [the wit-
ness'l testimony to search out other testimony to be
used in evidence against him,""8 and that such use
would violate the witness' right against self-incrimi-
nation.16 This was the first Supreme Court pro-
hibition of the "derivative" use of compelled testi-
mony. Congress, of course, adopted a transactional
immunity statute in the wake of Counselman. It
was not until 80 years or so later, following the
adoption of the current use and derivative use testi-
monial immunity statute, that the Supreme Court,
in Kastigar v. United States," concluded that im-
munity of the testimony from such derivative use as
well as direct use was constitutionally sufficient
protection.
While Counselman first set out the prohibition
against derivative use, it was the Court's 1963
decision in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission
3 8
which first suggested that implementation of this
prohibition would require that prosecutors have the
burden of proving that evidence introduced in a
subsequent prosecution was not "tainted" by the
compelled testimony. Murphy involved the situation
in which a state sought to, but could not, compel a
witness to testify despite his subsequent lack of
immunity from federal prosecution. But the Court
stated: "
Once a defendant demonstrates that he has
testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters
related to the federal prosecution, the federal authori-
"Id. at 564.
'O1d. at 564-565.
The Court later continued:
We are clearly of the opinion that no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after
he answers the criminating questions put to him, can
have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred
by the Constitution of the United States. [The immu-
nity statute under consideration] does not supply a
complete protection from all the perils against which
the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard,
and is not a full substitute for that prohibition. In
view of the constitutional provision, a statutory en-
actment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offense to which the
question relates. Id. at 585-586.
It is this language that Congress relied on in enacting a new
form of immunity statute, providing transactional immu-
nity, to replace the unconstitutional one. The new statute
was introduced as a bill on January 27, 1892, only sixteen
days after the Counselman decision. 23 CONG. REc. 573
(1892).
37406 U.S. 441 (1972). The immunity statute inter-
preted was 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (1970).
38378 U.S. 52 (1964).
"Id. at 79 n.18.
ties have the burden of showing that their evidence is
not tainted by establishing that they had an indepen-
dent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence.
Kastigar reaffirmed and elaborated upon this
obligation of the government, calling it at one point
"the heavy burden" '40 of proving that all evidence is
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent
of the compelled testimony.
Post-Kastigar Development of the Prosecutor's
"Heavy Burden. " Kastigar, however, did not elabo-
rate upon the nature and standard of proof of
non-taint required of the government upon the
subsequent prosecution of a compelled witness, a
point which, as others have noted, may seriously
alter the apparent holding in Kastigar.4 ' To the
extent that this "heavy burden" on the government
becomes impossible to overcome, the testimonial
immunity adopted by Congress and approved by
Kastigar will approach, in practice, the transactional
immunity which Congress specifically rejected when
it repealed 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1968).
While the Supreme Court in Kastigar clearly did
not call for such a result, subsequent lower court
decisions have suggested the development of what
might be styled an "impossible burden" standard.
For example, several courts have held that if a
prosecutor was exposed to a transcript of immunized
testimony, it was legally impossible for the govern-
ment to meet the standard of proof of non-taint. '
The same conclusion has been reached where suffi-
cient evidence to support the conviction was available
and admittedly untainted, and even if the prosecutor
did not know, 43 or could not have known,44 that the
transcript he read was of immunized testimony. This
rule prevents the government from even attempting
to prove that the exposure was so remote or so
minimal as to be of no consequence that neither it nor
its fruits were "used" in the criminal proceeding, a
point the government can often, if given the opportu-
nity, persuasively demonstrate. Further, the result
in these cases has not been the exclusion of evidence
10406 U.S. at 461.
41Comment, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Self-
Incrimination, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 181 (1972); Note,
Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar
and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171 (1972).42United States v. Rivera, 23 U.S.C.M.A 430, 50
C.M.R. 389 (1975).
43 United States v. Dornau, 359 F.Supp. 684, 687
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
4"United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 312 (8th
Cir. 1973).
4-See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 339 F. Supp. 1154
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (federal immunity from use or derivative
use, deriving from a state grant of transactional immunity,
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directly or indirectly tainted, as required by Kasti-
gar, 46 but complete dismissal. Thus the "impossible
burden" standard not only deprives the government
of an opportunity to meet its "heavy burden," but
also provides de facto transactional immunity to the
defendant. It is not clear whether these positions
reflect simply a judicial time lag in which certain
judges have not yet adjusted to the congressional
substitution of use immunity for transactional immu-
nity and, therefore, can be viewed as merely transi-
tional; or, whether such decisions represent a posi-
tive trend toward judicial frustration of congres-
sional intent through a type of collateral attack,
especially frustrating now that the Kastigar deci-
sion has settled the constitutional validity of the
federal "use immunity" statute.
Some commentators seem to echo these courts
resistance to the prosecutorial tool of "use" immu-
nity. Especially notable is a proposal in the Yale
Law Journal which suggests that prosecutors be
required to have a court certify all evidence against
a witness before he is compelled to provide testi-
mony, that in a subsequent prosecution the govern-
ment be restricted to using only such previously
certified evidence, and that prosecutors be required
to swear that they have not had access to the im-
munized testimony or any information derived from
it.
4 7
The first two features of this proposal are not
particularly objectionable. Prior certification of evi-
dence may in fact be an effective tool for prosecutors
themselves to utilize as a means of proving that their
evidence is independent of the immunized testimony.
And while it seems unnecessary to require that a
prosecutor swear that, to the best of his knowledge,
he has not directly or indirectly used immunized
testimony, this idea is not inherently objection-
able. 41
gave rise to a government burden to prove no taint in a
federal prosecution which was successfully met even though
the prosecutor had seen a newspaper article paraphrasing
the immunized testimony); United States v. Henderson,
406 F. Supp. 417 (D. Del. 1975).
46406 U.S. at 461-62. Dismissal with prejudice rather
than exclusion at trial has also been applied to indictments
brought by grand juries that had been exposed to immu-
nized testimony. Goldberg v. United States, 472 F.2d 513
(2d Cir. 1973).47 Note, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases
after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171, 182-183
(1972).
4 Such swearing, however, may not be sufficient under
the current law to meet the "heavy burden," since proof of
non-use is required; and, moreover, to conform to Kastigar,
the thrust of the oath must be that such testimony or its
fruits have not been used, not that the prosecution has never
had access to them.
The remaining and central aspect of the Yale Lao'
Journal's proposal is more troubling. A requirement
that the government, in any subsequent prosecution
that touches upon the compelled testimony, use only
evidence certified prior to the compelled testimony
amounts to a requirement that the investigation of
the witness for any related offenses cease upon his
compulsion. Protecting a witness from all evidence
obtained after such compulsion, even if from entirely
independent sources, is similar in effect to transac-
tional immunity. Not only does this requirement
destroy the primary advantage of the use immunity
statute, which is the ability to use evidence subse-
quently and independently developed, it resurrects
the primary disadvantage of the transactional immu-
nity statute in that witnesses could shield themselves
from subsequent prosecution simply by mentioning
past criminal activity in the course of their immu-
nized testimony, provided it was pertinent to the
inquiry at hand. Indeed, a prosecutor might not
even know about the creation of such immunity until
at a subsequent prosecution for an apparently
unrelated offense, the defendant is able to show that
during his previous immunized testimony he had in
fact mentioned activities which are related to the
pending prosecution. The clear absence of use or
derivative use of such immunized testimony would
not prevent the prosecutor from being restricted
to previously certified evidence, despite the fact that
prosecution in such a situation was explicitly pro-
vided by Congress and approved as constitutional
by the Supreme Court.
Thus, although the intent of the certification
proposal is to insure that the government's "heavy
burden" under Kastigar is actually met, certification
ultimately imposes a "crushing burden" on the
operation of use immunity by subtly incorporating
the most objectionable feature of transactional immu-
nity.
Aggravation of the "Heavy" Burden : Imposi-
lion by States, Courts, Defendants, and Other and
by Operation of Law. The federal prosecutor's
problems with proving that his evidence in a subse-
quent prosecution is untainted are aggravated by the
fact that such a burden can be imposed on him
without his approval and even without his knowl-
edge about it. Unauthorized imposition by another
federal prosecutor, in another district, has been held
enforceable, 49 but because of the coordination poten-
tial of the Department of Justice, should not present
insurmountable difficulties. There are a number of
other situations, however, in which federal prosecu-.
tors may have the burden imposed without their
4 9 United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).
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knowledge and approval, and indeed against their
wishes and against the public interest.
Courts have held that a discretionary grant of
testimonial "use" immunity by state prosecutors is
binding on federal prosecutors. 50 Consequently,
United States Attorneys must depend upon the vol-
untary cooperation of state authorities to eliminate
or minimize possible interference. Federal authori-
ties may often be unaware of a state grant of immun-
ity and the compulsion of testimony. 51 Nevertheless,
the burden of proving an independent source is
raised simply by the defendant's assertion that he
has previously made an immunized statement which
is in some way related to matters pertinent to the
current prosecution. 52
Testimonial immunity from use and the prosecu-
tor's corresponding burden to prove no taint have
also been made available without the approval or
knowledge of federal prosecutors by the courts in a
growing number of situations other than criminal
prosecutions. Without statuiory authority, courts
have granted testimonial use immunity to inmates
testifying before prison disciplinary proceedings,53 to
public employees before disciplinary hearings, 54 and
to defendants at deferred sentence hearings. " Pre-
"United States v. First W. State Bank of Minot, North
Dakota, 491 F.2d 780, 782 (8th Cir. 1974), citing Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 79 (1964), and United
States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973). The
federal government may be able to impose a grant of trans-
actional immunity upon the state. It did so under the now
repealed federal transactional immunity provisions of the
Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat.
216 (repealed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (1970), repeal
effective four years after the effective date of the later act,
i.e., Dec. 14, 1974). Yet it is not clear that a grant of trans-
actional immunity by a federal prosecutor in the form of in-
formal or equitable immunity, rather than statutory, would
also be applied to the states as transactional rather than as
use immunity. On the other hand, it has been held that a
grant of transactional immunity by a state will only im-
pose a use immunity obligation upon the federal govern-
ment. United States v. First W. State Bank of Minot,
North Dakota, supra at 786.
"United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
52See e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 79 n.18 (1964).
1
3 Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973);
Shimabku v. Britton, 503 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1974).
" United States v. Deritt, 499 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1974).
5 Flint v. Mullen, 372 F. Supp. 213 (D.R.I. 1974); but
compare California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).,The
Supreme Court only recently affirmed the en bane reversal
of a Ninth Circuit panel which had ruled that incriminating
information required by income tax returns be given
immunity from use in a criminal proceeding. Garner v.
United States, 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974), affd, 96 S.
Ct. 1178 (1976).
sumably, wherever the courts'create such an immu-
nity from use or derivative use, they also create a
prosecutorial burden to affirmatively prove non-use.
Perhaps most alarming is the fact that the court-
initiated immunity has not been viewed as a discre-
tionary action of the body receiving the testimony,
but is deemed to be an automatic result, provided by
operation of law, for any self-incriminating testi-
mony given.56 Consequently, while the protection of
testimonial immunity, as authorized by sections 6003
and 6004, has been transplanted to a variety of
situations, its attendant limitations-of a prior asser-
tion of a valid fifth amendment claim by the
defendant and of prior determination by the Attorney
General that the public interest is served-have not.
In effect, courts have created an "automatic immu-
nity" despite the fact that, with minor exception,
Congress has specifically repealed all federal auto-
matic immunity statutes.17 At the very least, these
non-statutory immunity authorities should be limited
by a provision similar to that which Congress
imposed upon its own authority to grant testimonial
use immunity in section 6005-that prior notice be
given to the Attorney General to allow him to voice
his objections and, if necessary, to take steps to
minimize the burden that the immunity would
impose on the Department.
Others have proposed still further enlargement of
the non-prosecutor group which is authorized to
cause testimonial use immunity to attach, and
thereby raise the burden of proving no taint, to
include judges and defense counsel.5" It should be
noted initially that this would not only lack a proper
statutory basis, but would be clearly contrary to
those provisions of the 1970 Act which specifically
limit compulsion and hence testimonial immunity
authority to the Attorney General '9 or Congress, for
use in carrying on its proceedings. 60 Perhaps for
these reasons the courts have so far uniformly re-
frained from creating such new authority in them-
selves or in defendants. 6
5
See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, 8. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1969) (discussing the dissatisfaction
with the operation of the automatic immunity statute of
1857 and its repeal); WORKING PAPERS OF THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAWS 1416-17 (1970).
11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (10) (1970) (providing automatic
testimonial use immunity for the bankrupt at the first
meeting of the creditors).
5 See the arguments of the defendants in cases cited at
note 61 infra; see also Letter, note 62 infra.
$918 U.S.C. §§ 6003-04 (1970).
6018 U.S.C. § 6005 (1970).
6"E.g., United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507
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Nor is there a valid constitutional basis for
establishing such authority. The right to confront
witnesses 62 is not applicable because it applies only
to a "witness against [the defendant]." Although
the right of the defendant to compulsory process is
applicable, it does not, and could not in any workable
system of criminal justice, be taken to outweigh the
right against self-incrimination of the witness, or
alternatively, to be sufficient basis for allowing a
defendant to impose the burden on the prosecution
of proving no taint as to a witness. Only the "public
interest," as required by section 6003, and "the
public's] right to every man's evidence" 11 are suf-
ficient to justify such compulsion and such a bur-
den.
On the issue of whether the "public interest"
would be served, a judgment made by a defendant is,
of course, wholly inappropriate. Judgment by a
court would also necessarily lack the information
needed accurately to decide such a question. 64 This
precise issue was considered and answered by Con-
gress in the current testimonial compulsion statute.
The Department's Efforts to Deal with Its
Increasingly "Heavy Burden. " While the burden on
federal prosecutors is heavy, it is, in the view of the
Department of Justice, not a wholly unhealthy one.
Such a prosecutorial burden is generally necessary
for the protection of the fifth amendment rights of the
F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222
(4th Cir. 1973); Cerda v. United States, 488 F.2d 720, 723
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Durham Concrete
Products, Inc., 475 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1973); Earl v.
United States, 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 921 (1967); Morrison v. United States, 365 F.2d
521 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Sangano Construc-
tion Co., Crim. No. 74-5 (S.D. Ill. May 1975). No court
seems to have dealt with the situation reserved in Earl v.
United States, supra, at 534 n.1, where the government
relies on critical testimony from "immunized" witnesses
but refuses to confer immunity on a seemingly crucial
witness sought to be called by the defendant. It seems clear,
however, that even assuming that due process would be
violated in such an instance, the remedy would not lie in
the courts' bestowing "immunity" on the defense witness
-an action which would "unacceptably alter the historic
role of the Executive Branch in criminal prosecutions"
(United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.
1976))-but rather in the imposition of some other sanc-
tion. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3rd Cir.
1976) (government ordered on retrial to grant immunity
to a defense witness if called, or to suffer entry of a judg-
ment of acquittal).
6 2Letter from J. CiRIN. L. & C. to John C. Keeney,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Apr. 28, 1975.
6 3See 8 WIGIORE § 2192 Q. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
"See Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d at 534 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
compelled witness. The Department's response to
these problems has not been, and will not be, to
attempt to avoid the burden, but rather to meet it
through more efficient and energetic federal prosecu-
tion.
Most importantly, the prosecutor dealing with the
burden must be aware of it when he applies for a
compulsion order and should plan ahead accord-
ingly. He can reduce the situations in which such a
burden of proving no taint would arise by prosecut-
ing beforehand, if possible, any person whose testi-
mony he needs to compel. Second, he can reduce the
possibility of taint in several ways, including; insur-
ing strict control of secret grand jury transcripts of
compelled testimony; segregating all compelled testi-
mony transcripts and limiting access to them to a
need-to-know basis; assuring that all who read such
transcripts have prior notice of their nature and the
taint problem; and requesting, when appropriate,
limitations on the disclosure of compelled testimony
given at trial. 6 Finally, he can increase his ability to
prove that no taint has occurred by developing a
system to document the people who have read the
transcripts or copies of them, and the people to
whom information contained in the transcripts has
been passed. 6
The device of compelled testimony under the 1970
Act is so useful to effective prosecution that efforts to
insure its continued viability will be undertaken,
however burdensome they might seem. Federal
prosecutors are determined to use these important
provisions in such a way that there will be no
justification for additional legislative or judicial re-
strictions upon them.
DEFENSE-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS INVOLVING
A DEFENDANT'S PROMISE TO PROVIDE
INFORMATION OR TESTIMONY.
A discussion of "immunity" would not be complete
without referring to alternative non-statutory modes
by which defendants have provided self-incriminat-
ing information or testimony to federal prosecutors
as an element of a defense-prosecution agreement.
Such an agreement may be a simple plea agreement
6 Arguably even the constitutional right to a public trial
may be made to yield to a substantial interest in limiting
disclosure of particular testimony. See generally Stamicar-
bon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 540
(2d Cir. 1974).
"Similar accounting procedures are required by the
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 52(a) (Supp. IV, 1974),
but disclosures between Department of Justice personnel,
including United States Attorney's Offices, are exempted
from such accounting requirements.
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in which promised information or testimony is a
relatively tangential and minor part, or an agreement
the central term of which is the information or
testimony in question.
The prosecutor's consideration for such agree-
ments may be a promise to move for dismissal of
certain charges, a promise to make or not make
certain recommendations at sentencing, a promise of
true "immunity" from prosecution for all matters
relating to certain transactions, a promise not to use
th" acompelled testimony or information against the
defendant, or perhaps a combination of any or all of
these. If the defendant upholds his part, these
agreements are judicially enforceable against the
prosecutor, even if the prosecutor has acted beyond
his authority. "7
Such agreements fall into three distinct groups:
(1) those that are primarily plea agreements where
the defendant's promise to testify is, by virtue of the
accompanying plea agreement, no additional conces-
sion; (2) those that are simultaneously a plea
agreement and an agreement to provide testimony or
information where the defendant's promise to pro-
vide testimony and information goes beyond what he
could normally be compelled to provide without some
kind of immunity; and (3) those that are solely
agreements to provide information or testimony, not
involving any plea of guilty by the defendant.
The first group does not appropriately belong
under the heading of non-statutory agreements to
provide testimony and is not covered by Department
of Justice policies regarding such "informal immu-
nity," although testimony or information may result.
A plea agreement in which a defendant pleads guilty
to one or more charges, or a lesser charge, in
exchange for a prosecution promise to move for
dismissal of the other charges, makes the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable both
as to the charges admitted and the charges dropped.
Assuming that the defendant fulfills the plea agree-
ment, he cannot be prosecuted for the former because
of the double jeopardy bar, or for the latter because of
the enforceability of the plea agreement. 68 Since the
defendant is truly "immune" from prosecution, his
67See, e.g., United States v. DeSena, 490 F.2d 692 (2d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir.
1972) (holding promise enforceable even against federal
prosecutors not involved in or aware of its being made);
United States v. Levy, 153 F.2d 995 (3rd Cir. 1946); In re
Kelly, 350 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Ark. 1972). See also,
United States v. Pepe, 367 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Conn. 1973).
If the witness does not keep his part of the agreement, the
government is no longer bound by the promise of immunity.
United States v. Ciotti, 469 F.2d 1204 (3rd Cir. 1972).
68Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
privilege against self-incrimination becomes inappli-
cable; he can therefore be compelled to testify
without receiving any additional statutory or infor-
mal testimonial immunity protection. His de facto
immunity stems not from any promise the prosecu-
tor might have made, but rather from the prosecu-
tor's inability to prosecute because of the plea agree-
ment. A prosecutor's promise not to prosecute in
such a plea agreement provides no additional legal
protection.
However, to the extent that the promise does
provide additional legal protection, that is, to the
extent that the plea agreement would not bar the
defendant's valid fifth amendment claim, the agree-
ment is something more than a plea agreement, and
therefore falls into the second category. This may
occur where, despite a plea agreement in one district,
the defendant is subject to further prosecution for
related matters from prosecutors of another federal
district or a state. The defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination would be applicable and his testi-
mony could only be compelled upon a grant of at
least testimonial use immunity. In such a situation
an informal promise of immunity would have some
actual legal effect.
Department of Justice policies regarding the use
of "informal immunity" apply to this aspect of an
agreement of the second group as well as to the third
group of agreements. The third group of agreements
are those in which the defendant makes a promise to
provide testimony or information but does not plead
guilty to any charge.
It should be stated that the Department generally
discourages the use of the second and third groups of
agreements by federal prosecutors except in certain
situations. Even then, specific limitations and proce-
dural requirements are imposed by the Department
of Justice on their use. For example, whenever a
defendant is to provide self-incriminatory testimony
under oath, at either a grand jury hearing or trial,
departmental policy specifically requires that the
compelled testimony statute be used in lieu of a
defense-prosecution agreement. The reasons for such
a policy are clear. Nothing more than use and
derivative use immunity, as provided by the statute,
is constitutionally required to compel testimony
under oath; no greater promise need be given by the
federal prosecutor; and since the statute provides
such protection, the statute is all that is needed by
the federal prosecutor. 9
The primary disadvantage to a prosecutor of such
"There are a very few exceptional circumstances where
the statute may not be adequate to compel testimony under
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statutory use immunity, as compared to an informal
promise of use immunity, is that it requires more
paperwork and may involve some delay. But the
paperwork and delay may be justified as the neces-
sary price of abiding by the clear legislative directive
expressed in the statute, and echoed by the courts,
that the Department be responsible for approving
and coordinating all applications to compel testi-
mony under the protection of immunity. In addition,
informal promises are increasingly being shunned by
knowledgeable defense counsel since they offer no
more protection than the statute and, although likely
to be held enforceable by a court, do not have the
obviously clear and dependable assurance of the
statute. Appearances are important as well to both
the government and defense counsel who, in many
instances and for a variety of reasons, will wish the
record to indicate the testimony in question was
"compelled" by court order rather than voluntarily
provided.
The Departmental preference for use of the
statute rather than informal defense-prosecution
agreement is necessarily limited to testimony to be
given under oath, since the statute is only available
for use in such situations. Even when testimony is
not to be given under oath, however, prosecutors are
counseled never to promise more than the use and
derivative use immunity which such information
would receive if compelled by the statute. There are,
in addition, a number of other specific guidelines
which the Department has set down to govern such
situations: any agreement must be reduced to a
written statement of understanding and should be
signed by the defendant or his counsel; all agree-
ments must be limited to pending or potential
charges within the district; and if an agreement could
reasonably be expected to indirectly affect prosecu-
tions in other districts, prior approval must be
obtained from those districts.
CONCLUSION
Under our system of criminal justice, federal
prosecutors are invested with considerable discretion
in the conduct of their duties. They are called upon
daily to make decisions as to which individuals are
appropriate subjects for investigation and, ulti-
oath. These might include those rare unavoidable situations
where time would not permit application under the statu-
tory procedures or where for some reason more than testi-
monial use immunity was needed and justifiable.
mately, prosecution on the basis of their involvement
in what appears to be activity which violates the
federal criminal laws. Sometimes, prosecutions are
declined on the basis of policy, e.g., the amount
involved may be de minimus, the individual may be
subject to effective state or local prosecution, or
personal characteristics of the defendant (age, infirm-
ity or mental condition) may militate against going
forward; however, in each instance the choice must
be a measured one, taking into account all the factors
present.
In like manner the prosecutor must decide upon
the utilization of the so-called "immunity" processes.
Careful choices must be made as to what the most
appropriate targets for effective prosecution may be
and as to what testimony should be sought to reach
the desired goal. There is nothing sinister in such
action. It is legislatively sanctioned, judically
approved, and has proved most effective in catching
the principal figures involved in major criminal
activities.
At bottom, if obliged to identify the major source of
public concern as to the so-called "immunity"
procedures, this author would rely on the perceptions
fostered by a "street ethic" we all carry forward from
childhood-that one should not "tell" on others or
be a "tattle-tale" 7 -- an ethic some would torture
into a "right" not to incriminate others in formal
proceedings designed to determine guilt or innocence.
There is no such right. Instead, the public has a
greater right, "the right to every man's evidence,"
and if prosecutors seek this evidence under terms that
are constitutionally valid, they are entitled to have it.
Those refusing to furnish such evidence rightly pay
the price for contempt of a valid court order. No
"new torture," no "coddling of criminals," no legal
legerdemain is involved in the use of the 1970 "use
immunity" statute. The fifth amendment prohibition
against self-incrimination remains intact and the
"rational accommodation" reached between it and
"the legitimate demands of government to compel
citizens to testify" inures to the benefit of all who
aspire to live in a peaceful and tranquil society.
" See, e.g., Harris, Annals of Law-Takzng the Fifth,
THE NEw YORKER, Apr. 12, 1976, at 86:
[llf the Rules of Civil Society were the
standard on which our criminal laws are based then no
one would be forced to talk about others or go to
prison, because scarcely anyone is regarded with more
scorn in the ordinary world than the Judas fig-
ure-from the childish tattletale to the adult infor-
mer.
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